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INTERNATIONAL  LENDING  WITH MORAL HAZARD  AND 
RISK OF REPUDIATION 
BY  ANDREW  ATKESON1 
In this paper,  I examine  the  constrained optimal pattern of  capital flows between  a 
lender and a borrower in an environment in which there are two impediments to forming 
contracts. The  first impediment  to  contracting arises from the  assumption that lenders 
cannot observe whether borrowers invest or consume borrowed funds. This assumption 
leads to a moral hazard problem in investment. The second impediment arises from the 
assumption that the borrower, as a sovereign nation, may choose  to repudiate his debts. 
The optimal contract is shown to specify that the borrowing country experience a capital 
outflow when  the  worst realizations  of  national  output  occur. This  seemingly perverse 
capital  outflow  forms  a  necessary  part  of  the  optimal  solution  to  the  moral  hazard 
problem in investment. 
KEYWORDS:  Sovereign lending, risk of repudiation, moral hazard, dynamic games. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
THE  HISTORY OF  INTERNATIONAL LENDING over the last one hundred  and fifty 
years  is marked  with numerous  episodes in which an indebted  country  has been 
denied new loans and has been asked to repay  its outstanding  debts after it has 
suffered  an adverse  shock  to its economy.  These episodes can take on the air of 
a crisis if the indebted country is  required to  reduce its consumption  and 
investment  to finance  even partial  repayment  of its obligations  at the same time 
that the country's  creditors  enjoy expanding  consumption  and investment.  We 
cannot  explain  the fact that a borrowing  country  has had to reduce  its consump- 
tion and investment  to repay  its debts simply  by identifying  the adverse  shocks 
that have buffeted this borrowing  country.  These indebted countries  are often 
relatively  small  players  in the world economy.  According  to a complete  markets 
model of lending, these countries should be able to share the risk of these 
adverse  shocks  with their creditors  more than they seem to be able to do. The 
debt crisis  of the 1980's,  although  it is only one example,2  is a particularly  good 
case illustrating  the failure of international  risk sharing:  at the same time that 
the United States enjoyed a decade of strong economic growth, it received 
capital inflows from many countries which suffered their worst decade of 
economic  decline since the Great Depression.  Neither can we explain  the lack 
of complete insurance  made available  through  international  loan contracts  on 
the grounds  that it is impossible  to make the repayment  of these contracts  state 
contingent.  Given the observation  that in many  cases borrowing  countries  have 
managed  to negotiate a partial  repayment  of their debts, it is evident  that some 
1The  author gratefully acknowledges helpful conversations with Patrick Kehoe, Ennio Stacchetti, 
Robert Townsend, Christopher Phelan, and the comments of two anonymous referees. 
2 Debt  crises  in the  international bond  markets were  common  in the  nineteenth  century. See 
Eichengreen and Portes (1986) and Lindert and Morton (1989) for discussion of these episodes  and 
of the debt crises of the early twentieth century. These papers point out that the post-World War II 
era up to the early 1970's was unusual in its lack of private international lending. 
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degree of state contingency  or risk sharing  is built into international  lending.3 
This implicit risk sharing  built into the process of debt recheduling  and debt 
renegotiation,  though, apparently  is not complete enough to prevent  the broad 
deviations  from the predictions  of simple models of risk sharing  in complete 
markets  that are associated  with debt crises. 
In this paper, I develop the idea that the pattern  of capital flows, consump- 
tion, and investment  associated  with debt crises arises as part of the optimal 
pattern  of capital flows  when capital flows among countries  are constrained  by 
two market  imperfections:  moral hazard  and the risk of repudiation.  To intro- 
duce the moral hazard  problem  into my model, I assume that lenders cannot 
observe  whether  borrowers  invest  borrowed  funds efficiently  or simply  consume 
them. To introduce  the risk of repudiation,  I assume  that borrowers  can at any 
time repudiate  their debts. I show in this model that the borrower  experiences 
capital outflows and suffers a fall in consumption  and investment after low 
realizations  of output  as part  of the constrained  optimal  pattern  of capital  flows. 
This result is consistent  with the idea that the reversal  of capital flows and the 
fall in consumption  and investment  that is seen in highly indebted countries 
during  an international  debt crisis  may arise as part of the mechanism  by which 
lenders induce borrowers  to invest borrowed  funds efficiently. 
Specifically,  I examine  the optimal equilibrium  pattern  of capital flows in an 
environment  in which there are two impediments  to contracting  that do not 
arise in the full-information,  full-enforcement  competitive model of interna- 
tional lending. The first impediment  to contracting  in the model I examine 
arises from the assumption  that lenders cannot observe whether borrowers 
choose to invest  or simply  consume  the proceeds  of loans. With this assumption 
that lenders cannot perfectly  monitor  the amount  that borrowers  invest in this 
environment,  for reasons  of moral  hazard,  borrowers  are unable to obtain  loans 
which  allow  them to completely  smooth  their consumption  across  shocks  to their 
output. The optimal pattern of lending in this environment  must necessarily 
incorporate  sufficient  variation  in the borrower's  consumption  as a result of 
variation in his output so as to provide him with the incentive to invest in 
increasing his output. The second impediment to contracting  in this model 
arises from the assumption  that lenders cannot appeal to some third party to 
enforce repayment  of loans. With this assumption  that loan repayment  cannot 
be enforced  arbitrarily,  for fear of the risk  of repudiation,  lenders in this model 
must limit the size of repayments  that they demand  of borrowers  and thus the 
size of loans that they are willing to make. I characterize  the loan contract 
which best overcomes the moral hazard problem in lending within the con- 
straints  imposed by the risk of repudiation  in a fully dynamic  environment.  I 
show that when low realizations  of output are a sufficiently  strong indicator  of 
low past investment,  then the optimal  manner  in which  to provide  incentives  for 
the borrower  to invest necessarily  involves  specifying  that the borrower  export 
3See  Grossman and van Huyck (1988) for a discussion of the implicit state contingency built into 
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capital and suffer a  fall  in  consumption and investment after the  lowest 
realizations  of output. 
My assumption that lenders cannot perfectly monitor the  amounts that 
borrowers  consume and invest is intended to capture  the spirit of the various 
difficulties  actual lenders have in monitoring a borrower's  use of borrowed 
funds. For instance,  if, as a result of government  interference  in markets,  good 
market prices or shadow values are not readily available in the borrowing 
country  for use in evaluating  project  performance,  a lender may not be able to 
distinguish  efficient  investments  made by the borrower  from those containing  a 
disguised  component  of consumption.4  Alternatively,  in lending to a sovereign 
government,  lenders  may  find it difficult  to verify  whether  the full impact  of that 
government's  policies as a package is to further national adjustment  to  an 
adverse shock or to provide consumption  subsidies to its citizens. My second 
assumption,  that lenders cannot appeal to some third party to enforce repay- 
ment of loans, is a reflection  of the fact that the borrowers  are sovereign  nations 
and may choose to repudiate  their debts. 
The technical  approach  I use in solving  for the optimal  equilibrium  allocation 
in this environment  is similar to the approach used by Abreu, Pearce, and 
Stacchetti (1986, 1990) for solving for the set of  sequential equilibria of  a 
repeated Cournot  oligopoly  game with imperfect  monitoring  and the approach 
taken by Spear and Srivastava  (1987) for solving  for the optimal  contract  in the 
repeated principal-agent  incentive  problem.  In these other papers, the authors 
show that the problem  of finding  the set of payoffs  from equilibrium  strategies 
or incentive compatible  contracts  can be restated as a recursive  problem.  The 
optimal equilibrium  outcomes also prove easier to  analyze in this recursive 
setup. In the Cournot oligopoly problem, the optimal equilibrium  outcome is 
Markov  in last period's  observed  price, and in the principal-agent  problem,  the 
optimal  long term contract  is Markov  in the new reservation  utility  promised  to 
the agent in the remainder  of the contract.  The optimal contracting  problem 
that I present in this paper is similar  to these other models in that it can be 
restated in a recursive  formulation.  The model I use to describe international 
lending, though, differs  from the standard  repeated principal-agent  problem  in 
several important respects. Firstly, the  borrower in  this model is  free  to 
repudiate  the contract  at any time.5 Most importantly,  though, the borrower's 
output net of repayments  of previous  loans is a physical  state variable  which 
alters the  feasible set  of  actions and payoffs that can be  attained in  any 
continuation  of  the lending problem, so that this is a dynamic rather than 
repeated environment.  In this dynamic  environment,  the specification  of the 
loan repayment  schedule affects not only the borrower's  payoff in the current 
round but also his prospects for future rounds by changing  the state variable 
and thus the dynamic  problem  that is faced in the continuation.  I show in this 
4 The borrower may disguise consumption as investment in a number of ways, including through 
the overemployment of labor or through outright fraud in the execution of  an investment project. 
SPhelan  and  Townsend  (1991)  discuss  how  to  handle  this  type  of  constraint  in  the  repeated 
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dynamic  environment  that the optimal  pattern  of capital  flows is Markov  in this 
physical  state variable  and that it has a particularly  simple structure.  At each 
date, the  continuation of  the  constrained Pareto optimal contract is  itself 
constrained  Pareto optimal and like the original  contract,  it awards  all of the 
remaining  surplus  to the borrower.6  After I present this contracting  problem  in 
the appropriate  recursive formulation,  I use these results to  show that the 
borrower  necessarily  suffers a capital outflow and a fall in consumption  and 
investment  when the lowest range of outputs are realized. 
This paper is organized  as follows. I describe the environment  in Section 2. 
Then, in Section 3, I define the optimal contracting  problem  when allocations 
are constrained  both by moral  hazard  and the risk  of repudiation.  In Section  4, I 
show that the optimal contracting  problem  can be equivalently  restated in the 
space of  current controls and value functions using an  adaptation of  the 
concepts of self-generation  and factorization  developed by Abreu, Pearce, and 
Stacchetti  (1986, 1990).  I provide  a proof of existence  of the optimal  contract  in 
Section  5 and I discuss  conditions  under  which  the value of the optimal  contract 
as a function  of the state variable  is continuous.  Using these results,  I show that 
the problem of finding the constrained  optimal contract can be stated in a 
recursive  formulation  as a functional equation in Section 6. In Section 7, I 
analyze the  characteristics  of  the  optimal debt contract by analyzing this 
functional equation. I  present the  proofs to  Propositions 1  and 2  in  the 
Appendix. 
2.  THE  ENVIRONMENT 
In this environment  there are two types  of agents.  There is one infinitely-lived, 
risk-averse  agent, whom I call the borrower.  In addition  to the borrower,  there 
is a sequence of short-lived,  risk-neutral  agents,  whom I call lenders, arranged 
in overlapping  generations.  A single lender is born in each period and each 
lender is alive for two periods. The borrower  has an investment  opportunity 
which offers stochastic  returns.  Increased  investment  by the borrower  shifts the 
distribution  of returns towards higher returns. Moral hazard constrains  con- 
tracts  between the borrower  and the lenders because the borrower's  consump- 
tion of the single good and the level of his investment  are unobservable.  The 
lenders are endowed  with a large quantity  of the single good in each period in 
which they are alive. 
6 There are several results related to the results here in the information and incentives literature. 
The  following  are  of  particular  interest.  Phelan  and  Townsend  (1991)  discuss  how  to  obtain 
numerical solutions to the repeated principal-agent problem and demonstrate that the continuation 
of the optimal contract in the repeated principal-agent problem is not always Pareto optimal. Their 
methods  may be  useful  in solving numerical examples of the present  problem. Fudenberg, Holm- 
strom, and Milgrom (1990) demonstrate in the repeated principal-agent framework that if the agent 
has access to free borrowing and lending at a fixed interest rate, then the optimal long term contract 
can be rearranged into a sequence of optimal short term contracts. The borrower in my paper does 
not have access to unlimited borrowing and lending at a fixed interest rate. A similar result to the 
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The environment  is described  more specifically  as follows.  There is an infinite 
horizon.  Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1,  2,....  The single borrower  is 
alive in all periods t > 0. The borrower  is endowed  with quantity  Y0  -  do of the 
single good at time t = 0. The consumption  of the borrower in period t  is 
denoted ct. Given investment  by the borrower  of I, units of the good at time t, 
the borrower's  investment  opportunity  yields as output  the random  variable  Y4+  1 
(with support Y) in units of the good at time t + 1. There is one lender born 
each period and each lender lives two periods. The lender born in period t is 
alive in periods t and t + 1. Each lender has an endowment  of size M in each 
period he is alive. The negative of the consumption  net of endowment  of the 
young lender born in period t is denoted dt+1. I refer to the quantity  bt as a 
loan and quantity  dt+1 as a repayment  without  implying  constraints  on the signs 
of  these  variables. In  keeping with  this  convention, I  refer to  the  pair 
(bt, dt+1(Yt+1))  as a loan contract  and the function dt+1(Yt+1)  as a repayment 
schedule.7 
An allocation  in this environment  is defined to be a plan which specifies the 
disposition of  the  current output Yt between current consumption for the 
borrower, the old lender, the young lender, and investment in the  storage 
technology.  The plan for the disposition  of current  output may depend on the 
entire observable  history  of realization  of outputs, loans, and repayments.  For 
convenience,  I choose to use the variable  Qt = Yt-  dt to summarize  the history 
dependence of the allocation.  Thus, an allocation o( specifies the consumption 
of the borrower,  c, investment,  I, loans, b, and repayment  schedules,  d, written: 
_  =  {ct(Qt),  'I(Qt)  bt(Qt)  d t+(Yt+;  Qt)}" 
where Qt=(Qo0Ql,...,  Q).  An  allocation is marked with initial conditions 
Yo,  Qo, do and Qo = Yo  -  do. 
Denote  the consumption component  of the  allocation by aC, the investment 
component  by o',  and so on. Denote the actions specified  by the allocation  in 
time t and state Qt by 0ot(Qt). 
DEFINITION:  An allocation  is feasible if for all t > 0, Qt, Yt  e Y: 
(1)  ct(Qt)  -  bt(Qt)  + It(Qt)  < Yt  -  dt(Yt) 
with  ct(Qt),  It(Qt) >0,  bt,  -dt  < M,  and Y0,  Qo0  do  given. By convention 
do,= o. 
The following three assumptions  describe the structure  of returns  from the 
borrower's  investment  opportunity. 
7I  model loans as having  state contingent  repayment  schedules  in the spirit  of the reality  that 
international  loans, while nominally not state contingent, are made state contingent through 
frequent reschedulings  of repayments  coming due. See Grossman  and van Huyck (1988) for a 
discussion  of the implicit  state contingency  built into international  lending.  The central  issue being 
explored  in this paper  is the question  of why this implicit  mechanism  for making  international  loan 
contracts  state contingent  fails to provide  borrowing  countries  with full insurance  against  adverse 
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ASSUMPTION  1: The  support of  realizations  of  output  Y from  the  storage 
technology each period is the finite set Y=  {Y1,Y2,...,  YN with Yn  >  Y1  > 0. 
ASSUMPTION  2:  The distribution of output in any period t + 1 depends only on 
the investment level in.period t.  Write the vector of probabilities of realization of 
output  level  Y'  tomorrow  given  investment  I  today,  as  g(Y';  I)= 
WgY,  A.I),  *  M  *  (  PsI). 
ASSUMPTION  3:  g(Y'; I) > 0 for all i e  {i,...,  N}  and I e I. 
This assumption  guarantees  that there are no observations  of  Y' that allow 
the lenders to infer with certainty  that the borrower  did or did not invest at 
some level I. 
In order to focus attention  on the borrower's  side of the optimal  contracting 
problem,  I impose two additional  assumptions  about  the lenders  in this environ- 
ment. First, I assume  that lenders  can bind themselves  when young  to carry  out 
the terms of a contract  when they are old. This assumption  ensures that the 
borrower  can costlessly enforce his right to make withdrawals  in those contin- 
gencies in which a negative repayment  dt+1 is called for. One should think of 
the lenders as banks which for reasons outside the model find it too costly to 
renege on  their depositors. Second, I  assume that an old lender who has 
suffered  a repudiation  of his loan may  costlessly  seize any deposits  the borrower 
might make with a future lender as compensation  towards  his loss. This right 
can be sold from one generation  of lenders to the next until the loss has been 
entirely  compensated.  This assumption  prevents  the borrower  from playing  one 
lender off against  another  through  a strategy  of repudiating  a repayment  to the 
current  old lender and then using  the funds intended  for repayment  to establish 
a deposit with a future young lender against  which he might make withdrawals 
to smooth consumption  without applying  for future loans.8 
The borrower  has preferences  over allocations  denoted by UB(o.) and charac- 
terized by 
00 
UB(oc) =  (1 - 8)1Eo  E  8tu(ct(Qt)) 
t =O 
with  u  bounded  above by  u-, u' > 0,  u'(0) =  + oo, and  u" < 0.  E'  denotes  the 
mathematical  expectation conditional  on the information  available  at time 0, 
taken with respect to the probability  measure  induced  by the allocation  oc.  The 
lender born in period t, t > 0, has preferences  over the expected value of his 
consumption,  where the expectation  is taken conditional  upon the realization  of 
Qt at the time of his birth. These preferences are denoted by ULt(olQt) and 
8 See Bulow and Rogoff (1988) for a detailed discussion as to why this assumption is necessary to 
support any lending at all in this environment. INTERNATIONAL  LENDING  1075 
characterized  by 
ULI(oIQt)  =  -bt(Qt)  +8  E  dt+1(Yt+1;  Qt)g(Yt+1;  It(Qt)) 
Y,+1  eY 
where orlQt  is the continuation of an allocation after Qt has been  realized. 
I confine myself to examining  allocations  which are both feasible and which 
provide all parties to the contract supporting  the allocation with at least as 
much utility as could be obtained by not contracting  at all. The reservation 
utility of the lenders in this environment  is zero; they can always  receive zero 
consumption  net of endowment  by not entering  into any contracts.  The reserva- 
tion utility of the borrower  is defined by the expected utility he can receive 
refusing  all loans and consuming  and investing  in the storage  technology  on his 
own. This reservation  utility that the borrower  can obtain in autarky  is the 
solution to the following  programming  problem: 
UaUt(Z)  =  max (1-  5)u(Z  -I)  + 5  E  UBut(Y )g(YI;  I). 
Y'eY 
ASSUMPTION  4:  (1 -  5)u(O) +  Hu < Uaut(Y1). 
This condition ensures that there are levels of current  consumption  so low 
that the borrower  prefers  the autarkic  allocation  to an allocation  which  specifies 
these low levels of current  consumption,  regardless  of what levels of consump- 
tion were to be offered in the future. I use this assumption  to place a lower 
bound  on the level of the state variable  that can be considered  in an equilibrium 
loan contract. 
An  allocation cannot be  supported by contracts in  equilibrium  unless it 
provides each agent with expected utility at least as great as his reservation 
utility  in every  round  of contracting.  This constraint  is expressed  as follows. 
DEFINITION:  An allocation  is individually rational if 
(2)  UB(oIQt)  > Uaut(Qt)  and  UL (oIQt) > O 
for all Qt, t > 0. 
3.  THE  CONSTRAINED  PARETO  PROBLEM 
In this section I define the constraints  on the set of allocations that are 
imposed  by the problems  of moral  hazard  and the risk  of repudiation  and then I 
set up the problem  of finding  the constrained  Pareto optimal  pattern  of capital 
flows. I begin with the constraints  imposed  by the risk of repudiation. 
To define the set of allocations  which are free from  the risk  of repudiation,  I 
must describe explicitly  the range of punishments  that the lenders can impose 
upon the borrower  for repudiation.9  In this environment,  the lenders have no 
9 By assumption it is unnecessary to consider the possibility that the lenders will repudiate their 
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direct sanctions with which to punish the borrower if he repudiates his debts.10 
On the other hand, the lenders can indirectly punish the borrower for repudia- 
tion  by  refusing  him  further  loans.  Facing  lenders  who  refuse  to  lend,  the 
borrower obtains  his  autarkic utility as his minimax payoff. We  also  see  that 
lenders can credibly refuse to provide further loans (b > 0) in a perfect equilib- 
rium as follows. If, in any period,  all future lenders plan to deny credit to the 
borrower, then the borrower finds it in his interest to repudiate any outstanding 
loans.  Given this fact, a lender who recognizes  that all future lenders will not 
lend must refuse to accept any contract with the borrower that specifies b > 0 or 
any  d'(Y') > 0  since  he  knows  that  the  borrower will  repudiate  any positive 
repayments specified by that contract. Finally, given our assumptions about the 
lenders, we see that the borrower cannot establish savings deposits (b < 0 or any 
d'(Y') < 0) to  smooth  his consumption  after repudiating his  debts  since  these 
deposits are subject to seizure. Thus, the worst punishment that the lenders can 
impose  upon  a borrower who  repudiates  his  debts  is the  borrower's autarkic 
utility. 
I characterize allocations which can be supported by loan contracts under the 
threat of repudiation as follows. 
DEFINITION:  An  allocation  oa is immune from  the threat of repudiation if for 
all t >  0, Qt, Yt  +  e  Y, the continuation allocation  -I  Q';y  +S1  after the realization 
of output  Yt+1 from the storage technology, satisfies: 
(3)  U(0_1Qt;Y,+1)  > UaU  (t+1) 
An  allocation  satisfies  the  constraints  imposed  by  the  problem  of  moral 
hazard  if  the  borrower  finds  it  optimal  to  carry out  the  consumption  and 
investment  plan  specified  in  the  allocation  when  he  takes  the  lending  and 
repayment plans specified as given: 
DEFINITION:  An allocation  a- is incentive compatible if for all feasible alloca- 
tions  a-' =  (o- c  -It, a-b, Cd)  (with the components  o-b  and o-  d  unchanged): 
(4)  UB(a-)  >  UB(a-I). 
I can now state the optimal contracting problem to be studied in this paper. 
DEFINITION:  An allocation cr is constrained Pareto optimal if it maximizes the 
borrower's payoff UB(or)  subject to the constraints of (1) feasibility, (2) individ- 
ual rationality, (3) immunity from the  threat of  repudiation,  and (4) incentive 
compatibility. 
10 See  Bulow and Rogoff (1989) for a model of international lending in which the repayment of 
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The difficult part of solving this program is understanding how to handle the 
last incentive compatibility constraint. If positive  investment is specified in an 
equilibrium allocation,  then  full insurance is not  incentive  compatible.  Under 
full  insurance,  the  borrower will  invest  nothing  because  his  payoff does  not 
depend  upon  the  output  from his  investment  opportunity and thus  does  not 
depend  upon  his level of  investment. It is clear, then,  that the utility that the 
borrower receives from the continuation of the equilibrium allocation must vary 
sufficiently with the results of some statistical test on the realization of output 
Y' so  as to  induce  the borrower to  make the  equilibrium level  of  investment. 
Because  the borrower will be choosing investment in anticipation of the test on 
output that determines his continuation payoff, standard results from hypothesis 
testing do not apply. When this strategic consideration is taken into account, the 
optimal statistical test on output and the optimal manner in which to make the 
borrower's continuation payoff depend on the results of that test is not obvious. 
We know from study of the repeated Cournot oligopoly problem with imper- 
fect monitoring"  and the repeated principal-agent problem12  that this incentive 
problem can be  reformulated as a recursive problem with a solution which is 
Markov if only  the  appropriate state  variable can be  found.  In the  repeated 
oligopoly  problem,  this  state  variable  is  the  price  observed  in  the  previous 
period.  In the  repeated  principal-agent problem, on the other hand, this state 
variable is the reservation utility promised to the agent for the remainder of the 
problem.  In the  next  section,  I  demonstrate  that  the  problem  stated  here  is 
recursive once  Q,  the  amount of the consumption good the borrower has left 
after paying outstanding loans, is taken as the state variable. 
4.  THE  TRANSFORMED  PARETO  PROBLEM 
In this section,  I demonstrate  that the correspondence  of payoffs which the 
borrower can obtain from allocations which satisfy the constraints of the optimal 
contracting problem above can be defined recursively using an adaptation of the 
notations  of  admissibility, self-generation,  and factorization of  Abreu,  Pearce, 
and Stacchetti (1986, 1990).13 In Section 6, I will use this result to show that the 
constrained Pareto optimal allocation itself can be found as part of the solution 
of  a functional  equation  similar to  a Bellman's equation  and that the  optimal 
allocation is necessarily Markov in structure. 
The central ideas behind the results of this section  are very similar to those 
behind dynamic programming. I seek to characterize the correspondence which 
defines the set of payoffs that the borrower can obtain from allocations which 
satisfy constraints (1)-(4)  at each initial value of the state variable Q. I call this 
it  See Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986, 1990). 
12 See Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Phelan and Townsend (1991). 
13 For those who are familiar with the techniques of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986, 1990), 
the  results  of  this  section  are  the  natural  extensions  of  their  propositions  self-generation  and 
factorization  to  this  problem  with  a  state  variable.  The  definition  of  admissibility  has  been 
generalized to include the state variable. Otherwise the proofs proceed along the lines of the proofs 
of Propositions 1 and 2 in their paper and will be included here in the Appendix. 1078  ANDREW  ATKESON 
correspondence  the borrower's utility possibility correspondence.  I observe that 
any payoff that  can  be  obtained  for  the  borrower from  an  allocation  which 
satisfies constraints (1)-(4)  can be factored into a payoff from the actions taken 
in the first period and the expectation over the payoffs to the borrower from the 
actions  to  be  taken from the  second  period  onwards, where  these  actions, of 
course,  are conditional  on the value of output less  repayments realized at the 
end  of  the  period.  More  simply, those  payoffs to  the  borrower from actions 
taken in the second period onwards can be summarized by a continuation value 
function which takes on the value to the borrower from the continuation of the 
allocation after every possible realization of Q1.  Because the constraints (1)-(4) 
are  recursive,  the  continuation  of  any  allocation  which  satisfies  constraints 
(1)-(4)  also satisfies these same constraints. Thus every allocation which satisfies 
constraints  (1)-(4)  yields  a  payoff  to  the  borrower  in  the  utility  possibility 
correspondence  which  can  be  factored  into  a  payoff  to  the  borrower  from 
current actions and an expectation  over a continuation value function which is 
itself a selection from the borrower's utility possibility correspondence. 
I also prove a converse of this property. Specifically, I show that any payoff 
that  can  be  obtained  for  the  borrower  through  current  controls  and  some 
continuation  value  function  which  satisfy one  period  versions  of  constraints 
(1)-(4)  and for which the value function is a selection from the borrower's utility 
possibility correspondence  can also be obtained through some  allocation which 
satisfies  the  original  constraints  (1)-(4).  I  call  a  set  of  current controls  and 
continuation  value  function  admissible  if  they  satisfy one  period  versions  of 
constraints (1)-(4)  and if the value function is a selection  from the borrower's 
utility  possibility  correspondence.  Armed  with  this  characterization  of  the 
borrower's utility possibility correspondence in terms of admissible controls and 
value  functions,  I  am  able  to  restate  the  optimal  contracting  problem  as  a 
recursive problem in a space of current controls and value functions. 
Define  the borrower's utility possibility correspondence,  V, with domain Q to 
be,  for each initial value  of  Q E Q, the  set of payoffs which the borrower can 
obtain from allocations which satisfy constraints (1)-(4).  That is, for each value 
of Q, 
V(Q)  = {UB(o.)Io  satisfies (1)-(4)  and Q0 = Q}. 
The  correspondence  V  is not  empty-valued since  UaBut(Q)  E V(Q)  for all  Q. I 
characterize this correspondence  V in Propositions  1 and 2 of this section. 
I begin by defining admissibility with respect to  an arbitrary correspondence 
of payoffs for the borrower. Let W be any correspondence  defined over domain 
Q, with  W(Q)  nonempty-valued  and uniformly bounded  for  all values  in  the 
domain. Define  a set of current controls to be the vector A = (c, I, b, d') where 
c, I, and b are scalars and d': Y -* R. Define  a function  U to be a continuation 
value function if it is a selection from the correspondence  W, i.e. U: Q -* R, with 
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DEFINITION:  The  pair  (A, U)  of  current  controls  and  continuation  value 
function,  is  admissible with respect to  W at  Q  if it satisfies the  following  four 
conditions: 
(1')  c+I-b<Q,  b, -d'(Y')  AM,  c,I>0, 
(2)  (1-8)u(c)  + 3  E  U(Q')g(Y';  I)  >  Uaut(Q) 
and 
(2')  b <  E  d'(Y')g(Y';I) 
for all Y' c  Y', 
(3')  U( Y' -d(  YY)  ) >  UaBut('Y)e 
(4')  Iecargmax  (1 -  )u(Q  +b  -I-)  +  Fi,  U(Y' -d'(Y'))g(Y';I). 
I  y, -=y 
Conditions  (1')-(4')  are  the  analogues  of  feasibility,  individual  rationality, 
immunity from the  threat of repudiation, and incentive compatibility stated in 
terms of these current controls and continuation value functions. 
Denote  the payoff to the borrower generated by a pair (A, U) by E(A,  UXQ), 
where 
E(A,  U)(Q)  =  (1 -  3)u(c)  + 8  ,  U(Y'  -  d'(Y'))g(Y';  I). 
y' e y 
Denote  the set of payoffs that can be generated by pairs (A, U)  admissible with 
respect to W at Q by B(W)(Q),  where 
B(W)(Q)  ={E(A,  U)(Q)  such that (A,  U) 
admissible with respect to W at Q). 
DEFINITION:  The correspondence  W is self-generating if for all Q c  Q 
W(Q)  cB(W)(Q). 
PROPOSITION  1 (Self-generation): If  W is self-generating, then for all Q c  Q, 
B(W)(Q)  c  V(Q). 
PROPOSITION  2  (Factorization): V(Q) cB(V)(Q)  for all Q. 
The  formal proofs  of  these  propositions  are  straightforward adaptations of 
the proofs given by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986, 1990) and are included 
in the Appendix. 1080  ANDREW  ATKESON 
The value of the optimal contract as a function of the state variable V(Q) is 
defined pointwise: 
V(Q)=  sup  v. 
VEV(Q) 
We see  from Propositions  1 and 2 that  V(Q)  is characterized by the program: 
(P)  V(Q)  = sup  (1  -  )u(c) +6  E  U(Y'  -d'(Y'))  g(Y'; I) 
A,U  Y'E Y 
subject  to  the  constraint  that  (A, U)  be  admissible  with  respect  to  V  at 
Q ==Q0.14 
5.  ON  THE  EXISTENCE  AND  CONTINUITY  OF THE  OPTIMAL  CONTRACT 
In this section I demonstrate the existence of an optimal contract and discuss 
conditions  under  which  the  function,  V(Q),  which  defines  the  value  of  the 
optimal contract for each initial value of the state variable, is continuous. These 
results are used in the next section to arrive at a stronger characterization of the 
optimal debt contract. 
Given  the  assumption that  Y is finite,  I find it convenient  in analyzing the 
question of existence of the optimal contract to work directly with the vector 
Ud  =  (U(Y; 
-  d'(Y1')), 
.  .*  , U(YN  -d  (YN))) 
that results from the composition of a value function and a repayment schedule. 
Define  Ud, a vector  in  RN,  to  be  a  composition  of  a value  function  and  a 
repayment schedule with respect to a correspondence  W if 
(5')  Ud(Yi')eW(Yi'-  d'(Yi))  VYi'eY. 
LEMMA  1:  If W has a compact graph, then B(W)  has a compact graph. 
PROOF:  First, I demonstrate  that the  correspondence  B(W)  has a bounded 
graph.  Let  W  be  a  correspondence  with  a  compact  graph.  By  feasibility, 
consumption,  investment, lending  and repayments, are all bounded  above and 
below.  By Assumption  4,  the  state variable  Q  denoting  output  net  of  repay- 
ments  is  bounded  below,  and  by feasibility  it  is  bounded  above  by  YN+ M. 
Therefore, our choice space of vectors (A, Ud)  which are admissible with respect 
to  W  at  some  Q  is  contained  in  a  bounded  subset  of  a  finite  dimensional 
Euclidean  space.  Redefine  the payoff functional  E  to  accommodate  composi- 
tions  of  continuation  value  functions  and repayment schedules  in the  natural 
manner. This payoff functional is continuous in all its arguments since  g(Y'; I) 
is continuous in I  by Assumption 2. Thus B(W)  has a bounded graph. 
Second,  I demonstrate  that  B(W)  has a closed  graph. The  only constraints 
defining  B(W)  which  need  to  be  restated  to  accommodate  compositions  of 
14  Since we are maximizing the payoff to the borrower, the individual rationality constraint for the 
borrower is never binding in this program. The individual rationality constraint in the definition of 
admissibility can be simplified to apply only to the lender. INTERNATIONAL  LENDING  1081 
value functions  and repayment schedules  Ud are constraints (3')-(5')  and they 
are as follows: 
(3')  Ud  (  )D >  Ua t(i  )  vyi 
N 
(4')  I c  argmax  (1 -  S)u(Q  + b - f)  + 8 E Ud(Yif)g(Yi; 
iE  [O,Q+b]  i=1 
(5')  Ud(Yi)  E  W(Yi7 -  d'(Yi7))  VY. 
Let  {wn,  Qn)  be  a sequence  in the  graph of  B(W)  which converges to  a point 
(w, Q). By the  definition of  B(W),  there exists a sequence  of pairs of controls 
and value  functions  composed  with  repayment  schedules,  {A,  Ud,j,  each  of 
which satisfies constraints (1')-(5')  at Q,  and has payoff E(A,,  Udfl)(Qfl)  = w,. 
Because  the  space of  admissable controls and compositions  of value functions 
and repayment schedules  is bounded,  we  may assume  this sequence  of  pairs 
converges  to  some  limit  point  (A, Ud).  By  the  continuity  of  E,  we  have 
E(A,  Ud)(Q) = w. Constraints (1')-(3')  are closed so that they are satisfied in the 
limit  as  well.  The  correspondence  I*(Q  + b, Ud) defined  by  the  argmax of 
constraint (4') is upper hemi-continuous  by the  maximum theorem.  Thus  I E 
I*(Q + b, Ud) is  satisfied in the  limit so  constraint (4') is  also  closed.  Finally, 
constraint (5') is satisfied in the limit since W has a compact graph. Thus (w, Q) 
is in the graph of  B(W). 
LEMMA  2:  If graph(W1)  c graph(W2), then graph(B(W1)) c graph(B(W2)). 
PROOF:  The  constraints  defining  B(W1)  are  contained  in  those  defining 
B(W2). 
PROPOSITION  3:  V has a compact graph. 
PROOF:  Define  the correspondence  V1 to satisfy 
graph( Vj) = closure(graph( V)). 
By definition graph(V) c graph(V1). By Lemma 2, graph(B(V))  c graph(B(V1)). 
By Propositions  1 and 2, graph(B(V))  = graph(V).  By Lemma 1, graph(B(V1)) 
is  closed.  Because  graph(V1) is  the  smallest  closed  set  containing  graph(V), 
graph(V1) c graph(B(V1)), which implies that V1 is self-generating. By Proposi- 
tion  1,  graph(V1) c graph(V).  Therefore,  V  has  a  closed  and  thus  compact 
graph. 
By Proposition 3, we have that for each Q, an optimal loan contract exists. In 
the remainder of this section, I will discuss conditions under which the value of 
the optimal contract, V(Q),  is continuous in the state variable. I begin with an 
assumption  and  a  lemma  showing  that  the  set  of  maximizing arguments of 
constraint (4') is single-valued. 1082  ANDREW ATKESON 
ASSUMPTION 5:  Assume that the distribution  of output given investment  g(Y'; I) 
is given by the convex combination of  two underlying distributions go(Y')  and 
g1(Y') as follows: 
g(Y';  I)  = A(I)g0(Y)  + (1-A(I))g1(Y') 
with (go(Yi')/g1(Y7.)) monotone in i, 0 S A(I) <  1, A'(I) > 0, and A"(I) < 0 for all 
j15 
LEMMA 3:  Let g(Y'; I)  be defined as  in Assumption 5.  Then, the correspon- 
dence I *(Q + b, Ud) defined by constraint (4') is single valued. 
PROOF:  The first and second derivatives  of constraint  (4') with respect to I 
are as follows: 
N 
- (1 -  )u'(Q  + b -I)  + AA'(I) EUd(Yi  )(go(Y  f)  -9i(Yi  )), 
i=1 
N 
(1 -  S)u"(Q  + b -  I)  +  A"(  I)  E  Ud(Yi')(gO(Yi)  -g1(Yi  )). 
i=l1 
If  Efv  1Ud(Y7)(g0(Y')  -  gl(Yi)) >0,  then the  expression being maximized is 
strictly concave  in  I  and  thus  has  a  unique  maximizing argument. If 
El  jUd(Yj')(g0(Y7 ) -  g(Yi'))  < 0, then the expression being maximized is strictly 
decreasing  in I and thus is maximized  at I = 0. 
With Lemma 3, I may write the solution to constraint  (4') as a continuous 
function I*(Q + b, Ud). Substitute  this function into constraint  (2') to express 
the present  value of a loan contract  as a function  of b, given Q, d', and Ud: 
N 
L*(b;  d', Ud, Q) =  -b  +  8 ,  d'(Yi')g(Yi;  I*(Q  +  b, Ud))  > 0. 
i=1 
Notice that L* is continuous  in all its arguments. 
PROPOSITION  4:  Assume  that  for  any  pair  (A,  Ud)  which  satisfies 
L*(b;d',Ud,Q)>0  and  any  81 >0,  there exists  a  b1  with  Ib1-bI<81  and 
L*(bj;  d',  Ud,  Q) > 0. Then  V and V are continuous. 
PROOF:  I have shown that V  has a compact graph,  which implies that V  is 
upper hemi-continuous.  I need to show now that V is lower hemi-continuous. 
Let v E V(Q) and (A, Ud) be a pair admissible  with respect to V at Q with 
E(A,  Ud)(Q) -  v.  Take  e > 0.  Since  the  payoff  functional  E  and  investment 
function I* are continuous  in all their arguments,  we can find a 81 > 0 such that 
for all  b1 with  lb, -  bl <  81  and  I, = I*(Q  + bl,  Ud),  cl = Q + b, - I1,  we  have 
JE(A1, UdXQ) -  E(A,  Ud)(Q)l <E/2.  Furthermore,  we  have  assumed  that  for 
15  This assumption  about the structure  of the distribution  of output given investment  is taken 
from Grossman  and Hart  (1983).  It justifies  the use of the first  order  condition  in this case. INTERNATIONAL  LENDING  1083 
one particular  such b1, we have L*(bl;  d',  Ud, Q) > 0. Since L* is continuous  in 
Q, we  may find a  8 > 0  such that for all  Q1 with IQ1  -  Ql <8,  we  have 
L*(bj; d',Ud,  Q1)  > 0 and IE(A1, Ud)(Q1)  -  E(A1, Ud)(Q)I  < e/2.  By the triangle 
inequality,  for  all  Q1 with  IQ1  -  Ql < 8,  IE(A1, Ud)(Q1)  -  E(A1, Ud)(Q)I  < e. 
Furthermore,  (A1, Ud) is admissible  with respect to V at Q1. Therefore, V is 
lower hemi-continuous  and V(Q) is continuous. 
From Proposition  4, it is clear that the correspondence  V may fail to be 
continuous  when L*(b;  d',  Ud, Q) attains  a local maximum  in b at zero. I present 
the  following example in  which L*(b;  d',  Ud, Q)  satisfies the  conditions of 
Proposition  4. When A(I) is linear in I and u(c) = log(c), then I*(Q + b, Ud) 
and L*(b;  d',  Ud, Q) are linear  in b. The function  L*(b;  d',  Ud, Q) may  still prove 
to be identically  zero, but in this case, an argument  similar  to the argument  of 
Proposition  4 suffices  to show that V contains  no isolated  points. 
6.  THE  PARETO  PROBLEM  AS A FUNCTIONAL  EQUATION 
In this section, I find conditions under which we may rewrite the optimal 
contracting  problem  given  in program  (P) as a functional  equation.  This charac- 
terization of the optimal contract  via a functional equation yields the strong 
implication that the  long term relationship  between the borrower and the 
lenders  can be governed  optimally  by a sequence  of contracts  which are optimal 
in the short  term:  the continuation  of the constrained  optimal  contract  is always 
itself constrained  optimal.  I state the result in Proposition  5. 
PROPOSITION  5:  Assume  that  the  value function  V is  continuous.  Then the 
continuation value function  U which solves the program (P)  necessarily satisfies 
U  =  V. 
PROOF:  The proof proceeds by contradiction.  Let (A, U) be an admissible 
pair with_U(Yn  -  d'(Yn)) < V(Yn  -  d'(Yn)) for some  n. Construct an alternative 
pair (A, V) as follows: choose c = c,  I = I,  b = b and for each Y'  E  Y choose 
d'(Y')>d'(Y')  to  solve  V(Y' -d'(Y'))=  U(Y' -d'(Y')).  That  the  repayments 
schedule d'(Y') is well defined is seen as follows. Feasibility  constrains  con- 
sumption  to approach  zero as Q becomes sufficiently  low. By Assumption  4, 
there must then exist a value of the state Q* such that V(Q*) < UaBu(Y1).  By the 
admissibility  of U, U(Y'  -  d'(Y'))  >  U!ut(Yl)  for all Y', and for all Q', U(Q')  < 
V(Q'). Since V(Q) is continuous,  for each Q', there must exist one Q such that 
V(Q) = U(Q'). See Figure 1 for a picture of how the alternate  pair is formed. 
The pair (A, V-)  satisfies  constraints  (1')-(4') of admissibility  and, since V(Q')  E 
V(Q')  VQ', is thus admissible.  Also, we have E(A, U)(Q) = E(A, V)(Q). Clearly 
V is increasing.  Thus, if for some Y', V(Y'  -  d'(Y'))  > O(Y'  -  d'(Y')),  then 
E  d'(Y')g(Y';I)  >  E  d'(Y')g(Y';I) 
Y'EY  Y'EY 
so that constraint  (2') is relaxed.  We see that our ability  to relax  this constraint 1084  ANDREW  ATKESON 
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FIGURE 1 
An admissible continuation value function U must satisfy two constraints. The first constraint is that 
(Y' -  d'(Y')) <  V(Y'-  d'(Y')) for all Y'. The  second  is that  U  be  bounded  below by  Uj,,(Ymin). 
The function V is continuous and is not bounded below by UaBt(Ymin). Thus, for any admissable pair 
(A, U),  for each realization of output  Y', we can construct an alternate repayment d'(Y') to solve 
V(Y' -  d'(Y')) =  2(Y'  -  d'(Y')).  If,  for  some  Y',  U(Y'  -  d'(Y'))  <  V(Y'  -  d'(Y')),  then  d'(Y')  > d'(Y'). 
must imply a contradiction to the hypothesis that U is maximal as follows. Since 
from Lemma 3, I*(Q  + b, V1) is a continuous function, we may find a b' >  b and 
IF  = I*(Q  + b', f71)  for which 
b' S8  E  d'(Y')g(Y';  I') 
y'  e 
and which yields a strictly greater payoff for the borrower. Thus, we have that U 
cannot be the optimal continuation value function unless  U=  V. 
Given the results of Proposition 5, we may rewrite our program characterizing 
the optimal contract as a functional equation: 
PROGRAM  P*: 
(P*)  V(Q)  =  max(1-8)u(c)  + 8  E, V(Y'-  d'(Y'))g(Y';  I) 
A  Y  -Y 
subject to: 
(1')  c + I-  bSQ,  b, -d'( Y') S M,  c9  I > 0 
(2')  b S 8  E,  d'(  Y')  g (Y'; I),9 
(3')  (Y' -  d'(Y'))  > Uaut(Y')  VY', 
(4')  Ie[  argOmax  (1-s)u(Q+b'-i)+  E  V(Y'-d'(Y'))g(Y'; 
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This result, that the optimal contract is found as the solution to a functional 
equation,  arises  in  this  environment  because  it  is  always  possible  for  the 
borrower and lenders  to trade off a larger current repayment for an improve- 
ment of the continuation contract without disrupting the incentive compatibility 
of the original contract. Because the lenders are short lived, the current lender 
always strictly prefers a larger current repayment. Thus, the constrained optimal 
contract  which  awards all  of  the  surplus  to  the  borrower must  have  in  its 
continuation  constrained  optimal  contracts  (at  the  new  values  of  the  state 
variable) which award all of the surplus to the borrower. Were we to know the 
value function V, the problem of finding the constrained Pareto optimal pattern 
of capital flows would be a simple static problem.16 
7.  THE  OPTIMAL  PATTERN  OF  CAPITAL  FLOWS 
In this section I examine the circumstances under which the optimal pattern 
of capital flows specifies that the borrower export capital when the lowest levels 
of  output  occur. This  phenomenon  arises as part of  the  constrained  optimal 
pattern of capital flows when  a low realization of output is a sufficiently good 
indicator in a probabilistic sense that the borrower invested too little. To make 
these observations about the necessary features of the optimal pattern of capital 
flows, I employ the following additional two assumptions. 
ASSUMPTION  6:  Assume  that  the  value  of  repayments at  the  optimum  is 
increasing in investment: 
(7)  Ed'(Y')  (go(Yi')  - gl(Yi))  > ?. 
This amounts  to  an  assumption that,  at  the constrained optimum,  the lender 
would prefer that the borrower  make larger rather than smaller investments.17 
ASSUMPTION  7:  Assume that the constrained optimal investment level is inte- 
rior.  18 
I use these  assumptions to construct a Lagrangian for the program (P) above 
as follows. The assumptions above imply that the optimal incentive compatible 
16 Phelan and Townsend (1991) present numerical methods for computing solutions to recursive 
formulations of the repeated principal-agent problem. It should be possible to extend their methods 
to compute solutions to the current problem. The problem here is somewhat more difficult than the 
repeated principal-agent problem in that the utility possibility correspondence from which continua- 
tion values  may be  drawn is not known beforehand.  It must be  found  together with the  optimal 
contract in an iterative procedure. 
17 In  the  principal-agent  problem,  the  assumptions  that  the  production  technology  has  the 
monotone  likelihood  ratio property and that  the  agent is risk averse imply that the  schedule  of 
payments  to  the  agent  is  increasing  in  output  and  thus  at  the  optimum  the  expected  value  of 
payments  to  the  agent  is  increasing  in  effort.  (See  Rogerson  (1985).)  This  result  is  critical  in 
establishing the validity of the first order approach to summarizing the incentive constraint. Because 
I do not know the shape of the value function, V, I cannot obtain this result directly to justify the 
first order approach in this problem. Instead, I must assume an analogue of this result to proceed 
with the first order approach. 
18 Without this assumption, there is no moral hazard problem. 1086  ANDREW  ATKESON 
level of investment  I*  is the unique solution in  I  to the first order condition: 
-(1  -8)u'(Q  + b -I) 
+  8A'(I) EV(Yi'-d'(Yi'))(gO(Y7)  -g1(Yi7))  = ?. 
By  Assumption  6,  we  may  replace  this  equality  constraint  by  an  inequality 
constraint in our maximization program. Using this relaxed version of constraint 
(4'), we  may write a Lagrangian for the  program (P) in terms of  controls and 
compositions of value functions and repayment schedules: 
J(A,  Ud,)  =  (1-  5)u(c)  + 8  Ud(  ')g(  j'; I) 
+ I-C(  Q + b - C-I 
+ A2(  Ed'(Yc')g(Y';  I)  -b) 
+ 8  ,.  33(Y )g(Yi;  I)(Ud(Y)  -  Uaut(Y  )) 
+L4(-(1-  )u'(Q  +b-I)  +  E Ud(Yj  )g1(Yj,  I)) 
+  8  5Eti5(}j')g(}j;  I)(V(Y'  -  d'(Y'))  -  Ud(Yj'))- 
I  analyze  the  properties  of  the  optimal  repayment  schedule  through  an 
examination of the first order condition of this Lagrangian J with respect to the 
continuation  values  Ud(Y'). This  first order  condition  gives  conditions  under 
which  the  no  repudiation  constraint  binds.  We  then  see  that  the  borrower 
experiences  a net capital outflow when this constraint binds. 
The  first order  condition  with  respect  to  Ud(Y') from the  Lagrangian J  is 
written: 
1 +A4t  A(l  [  5  (  )D-  3 
Since  all  the  multipliers  are  nonnegative  and  A4  >  0,  then  /3  >  0 when  1 + 
Iv4(gI(Y';  I)/g(yj';  I)) < 0.  Thus, the  no  repudiation constraint binds when 
(g1(Yj';  I)/g(Yj';  I))  is sufficiently small. By Assumption  5, this ratio is mono- 
tone in i, so that if it is sufficiently small, it is so for low realizations of  Y'. This 
ratio is a measure of the likelihood that a low realization of output is due to low 
investment as opposed  to bad luck.19 
When the no repudiation constraint on the size of repayments is binding (as 
indicated  by  /3  >  0),  the  borrower,  in  the  continuation  of  the  contract, 
is  pushed  down  to  his  reservation  value.  From  Proposition  5,  Ud(Y')  = 
19 See  Grossman and Hart (1983) and Rogerson (1985) for a discussion of the interpretation of 
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V(Y' -  d'(Y')) at the optimum, so that when constraint (3') binds, V7(Y'  -  d'(Y')) = 
UJb(Y'). It is evident from a comparison of the programs that define V and ULJ 
that when the borrower is driven down to his reservation value, the  new loan 
that the  borrower gets  after the  realization of  Y' -  d'(Y') must be  no greater 
than d'(Y'). Thus, when constraint (3') binds, the borrower experiences a capital 
outflow. 
8.  CONCLUSION 
One  of  the  most  striking features  of  international  lending  is  the  repeated 
occurrence of crises in which creditors demand capital exports from borrowers 
who have suffered adverse shocks and cause these borrowers to suffer a fall in 
consumption and investment. The observation that creditors demand repayment 
and cause the borrower's consumption and investment to fall at the same time 
that the creditors do not suffer a similar economic  setback is inconsistent with 
the basic prediction of  the  complete  markets model  that there  should be  risk 
sharing in the international lending relationship. In this paper, I put forward a 
model  of  international  lending  which  specified  moral hazard and the  risk of 
repudiation as the two reasons why risk sharing between  creditors and debtors 
is incomplete.  Then I showed that a debt crisis-like phenomenon  is part of the 
model's constrained optimal allocation. Specifically, I examined the constrained 
optimal pattern of capital flows between  lenders who cannot observe whether 
the borrower invests or consumes the proceeds of loans and a borrower who can 
repudiate his debts. These  features of the problem analyzed here are intended 
to capture the difficulties actual lenders have both in evaluating the efficiency of 
a  sovereign  borrower's investments  and  in  enforcing  the  repayment  of  debt 
across national boundaries.  I showed  that  the  constrained optimal pattern of 
capital flows over an infinite horizon necessarily has a simple Markov structure. 
I  then  showed  that  the  optimal  contract has  the  property that,  for incentive 
reasons, the borrower experiences  a capital outflow and a fall in consumption 
and  investment  when  a  range  of  the  lowest  realizations  of  output  in  the 
borrowing country occurs. This last feature of the model is the feature which is 
analogous to the debt crises which we observe. 
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APPENDIX 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  1:  I  proceed  by  constructing  for  each  wQ e B(W)(Q)  for  some  Q  an 
allocation  o(WQ)  such  that  UB(o-(wQ))  =  wQ  and  such  that  o(WQ)  satisfies  constraints  (1)-(4).  I 
present the proof in three steps. In the first step I construct o(wQ).  In the second step I verify that 
UB(o-(wQ))  = WQ.  In the third step I verify that o(WQ)  satisfies constraints (1)-(4). 1088  ANDREW  ATKESON 
Step 1:  Choose  a wQo  E B(WXQO) for some  Q0. There  is an admissible pair (A(wQo), U(wQo)) 
corresponding to WQo  such that E(A(wQo), U(wQo))(Q) = WQo.  Define  or(WQo)  inductively as follows: 
Let  ao(wQo)  =A(wQo).  For  any realization  of  Y1 and  new  value  for  the  state  Q1 = Y-dl(Y), 
Ql = (Qo, Q1), define WQI  = U(wQo)(Q1).  By the admissibility of (A(wQo), U(wQo))  and W self-gener- 
ating, WQI  E W(Q1) CB(WXQ1)  so that there is an admissible pair (A(wQI), U(WQl)) corresponding 
to WQI  such that E(A(wQl), U(wQI)XQ) = WQI.  Let orl(wQo)(Q1) =A(wQI). Repeat  this procedure to 
define all of  or(WQo). 
Step 2:  Now I show for any WQo  E W(Q0) for some Q0, that UB(cr(wQo))  =  WQo.  We have by the 
fact that WQo  = E(A(wQo), U(wQo)XQ): 
WQo  = (1 -  8)u(c)  + 8  E  U(wQo)(Yl  -  d1(Y1))g(Y1;  I) 
Y, GE  Y 
(where Q1  = Y, -  dl(Y1)). Since o-(wQo)lQi  = o(wQl),  we have 
UB(oJ(WQO))  =  (1 -  5)U(C)  + 8  E  UB(of(WQl))g(y1;  I) 
Y1  GE  Y 
where  WQi  = U(wQoXQl). Subtraction gives 
WQO -U  (cr(WQO))  =8(  E  WQ  -U  (U((WQQ))g(Y1;I)). 
Since g  is a probability distribution, we have that 
IWQO-UB(o (WQO))  |8  sup  IWQI-U  (0 (WQI))I. 
WQI  E=B(WXQI) 
Since this holds for all WQo  we have that 
sup  iWQO-UB(Of(WQO))|<8  sup  WQ1U  (of(WQI))I. 
WQoEB(WXQO)  WQ1  EB(WXQI) 
Since 8 < 1 and each set B(WXQ)  is uniformly bounded given the uniform bound on W(Q) and the 
bound on  u, we have 
WQ =  UB(cr(WQ))  VWQ  EB(W)(Q)  for some Q. 
Step 3:  Here I verify that o(wQ) satisfies conditions (1)-(4)  of admissibility. The allocation o(WQ) 
satisfies one round versions of the constraints (1)-(4)  by definition. That q(wQ) satisfies constraints 
(1)-(3)  is immediate.  We need  to verify that the borrower, when  faced with the  lending program 
specified  by or(WQ), does  not  have  a payoff improving multi-round (or potentially  infinite-round) 
deviation from the  investment program. We  show that there  are no  finite round deviations  from 
or(wQo)  for the borrower that would be payoff improving by induction as follows. There are no round 
zero deviations or(wQo) that are payoff improving for the borrower by definition. Assume that for all 
Q?, WQo,  there  are no  payoff improving deviations  for the  borrower from  cr(w  o) in the  initial  t 
periods. After any realization of Q', by the construction of o(WQo)  and the inductive hypothesis, the 
continuation allocation or(wQo)IQ1  = o(wQ0) also has the property that there are no payoff improving 
deviations for the  borrower in the  first t  periods. Thus there  are no payoff improving deviations 
from  or(WQo) for  the  borrower in  the  initial  t + 1 rounds  of  play.  We  know  that  there  are  no 
infinite-round deviations from or(wQo)  that are payoff improving for the borrower by the continuity 
of  the  borrower's preferences.  Since  the  set  of  feasible  payoffs for the  borrower is bounded,  the 
maximum gain to  the borrower from deviations in the  tail is bounded  and must go to zero when 
discounted. 
PROOF  OF  PROPOSITION  2: We show that the borrower's utility possibility correspondence  V  is 
self-generating,  which, by Proposition  1, gives us  the  result  that  V= B(V).  Let  VQ  E V(Q)  be  a INTERNATIONAL  LENDING  1089 
payoff generated  by  the  allocation  o(vQ)  which  we  assume  satisfies  constraints (1)-(4).  Define 
(A(VQ), U(vQ)) as follows: Let 
A(vQ)=cro(vQ)  and  U(vQ)(Ql)=  U'(a(vQ)IQ1). 
E(A(v  ) U(  )XQ)  vQ.  Since  o(vQ)  satisfies  the  original  versions  of  constraints  (1)-(4), 
(A(vQ$U?(VQ))  clearly satisfy the one-round versions and are thus admissible. 
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